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Chapter One 
Prameyas (things. events) and J L Shaw on avayavipratyak~a in 
the Nyaya and the troubled ontology of Middle Nyaya Realism* 
PramaT).adhrna prameya-sthitib. 
(Logic and epistemology supervene the grounding of ontology and 
metaphysics) 
Purushottama Bilimoria 
Deakin Unversity: University of Melborne: Stony Brook. New York. 
PADAI 
This homage to the continuing conversations 'With Dr J L 
Shaw is a friend's attempt to provide a brief survey and 
hermeneutic of the intriguing transformation or philosophic 
metamorphosis of the Nyaya during its 'middle' period. In his 
essay on 'Causality: Sarpkhya. Bauddha, and Nyaya'l, Shaw' 
mentions the Nyaya theory of avayavipratyak~a and how it 
answers some of the objections of a sceptic. Dr Shaw reflects 
on the argument for a physical object discourse in Indian 
philosophy. We are invited to note the well-known view that 
the Nyaya advocates an extreme form of direct realism which 
maintains that what we directly perceive are physical objects 
and not some intermediate entities called variously by 
philosophers 'ideas', 'contents' or even 'sense-data'2. In other 
. . 
words, this is realism without any trace of phenomenalism or 
nominalism. Moreover, all perceptual experience, including 
those that we call illUSOry. imaginary. erroneous, even 
hallUCinatory, have real objects which are apprehended in each 
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such cognitive episode or event, and that a causal explanation 
is possible for each object so apprehended. We rnight go a 
step further and say that, strictly speaking, apart from the 
physical objects given in perception the Nyaya is loath to admit 
into its paddrtha ontology just any kind of entities or 'things' 
- whether intermediate, mediate. immediate, or transcendental 
for that matter - that does not conform to the epistemic 
economy of this logicus determinus ('determinate' process, in 
contradiction to 'indeterminate' or even 'constitutive', meaJ;ling 
that the objective item is apprehended as a composite whole 
just as it is and not through a set of constructs, eliminative 
parts). Just as inference is ruled out in determining or positing 
the object of perception, say a tree, supposedly constituted 
out of an assemblage of parts, some of which the perceiver 
does not even see (e.g. the hind portion of the trunk, its roots, 
top-most branches, the hidden fruit, treeness, etc.), the Nyaya 
is reticent about admitting a plethora of 'new objects' - as 
distinct from newer understanding about or reasoning from 
such objects as are already given in perception. If an argument 
is to be made, Gautama (the preeminent founder of this so-
calle~ Logic School) is qUite clear that we have distinct 
apprehension of each of the so-called 'parts' of the object -
dravya (its substance), gur;a (its quality), karma (its activity), 
sdmdnya (its class), etc - that nevertheless yields the 
perception qua perception of the unitary object as a composite 
whole. (N.S. 2.1.34). 
Likewise. our knowledge of the world and the sparse 
furniture that fills it up is but a refined collocation of 
perceptions, certain inferred inter-relations and attested or 
certifie~ (via reliable testimony, dptavacana) purposiveness 
of a range of objects that make up this unitary whole. Thus 
the Nyaya - at least this praclna or 'ancient' school of 
BrahmaniC thought - could well be taken to pronounce 
parsimonio'usly that there are less things between here and 
the starry heavens above than all our folk stories (and SOllIe 
unrepentant philosophical views also) lead us to believe. 
However, this is not the complete story about the Nyaya. For 
as the philosophical sub-schools of Nyaya develop, gather 
intellectual strength (or, moss), and make new dialectical 
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strides in their defense against or even accommodation with 
some of the prevailing or nagging (counter-) attacks by its 
opponents and detractors alike (p ilrvapak!? as} , the Nyaya 
undergoes a curious change of mind and heart in respect of 
some of its foundational tenets and techne or methodology 
for its expanding knowledge-base. These internal shifts and 
transformations almost threaten the reputation of a school 
Ulithin the (Brahmanic) darsana cluster otherwise famous (or 
to some infamous) for its parsimonious and tightly guarded 
metaphysic. This latter COlllmitment undergirded an Ockham-
like stringency that hitherto had successfully warded off the 
familiar temptations toward metaphysical obscuration and 
transcendental flights, even as the Nyaya struggled to remain 
rooted (or later re-gained grounding) in a razor-edged logico-
empiricist positivism of sort.. The period in question is what I 
will call the 'Middle Nyaya' phase. This takes us to the period 
and development in question, namely. the 'Middle Nyaya' 
phase, which was referred to in Gailgesa's time as pracrna or 
the 'ancient' phase of Nyaya3 • The focus will here be on 
Gautama, Jayantabhatta, Bhasarvajila and Udayana. Before 
that though we need to look at the background of the truly 
'praclna' or ancient Nyaya philosophy since its inception to 
the dawning of the Middle period. 
It has been a contention of 'analytical' Indian philosophers 
to the effect, that in modern-day scholarship. due largely to 
the narrow judgment of lS-19thcentury Orientalists, Nyaya's 
logical realism has been mischievously identified with some 
primitive quest for theological and insufferable spiritual ends. 
A most forceful and articulate champion of this critique in 
recent times has been the late Professor Bimal MatHal4 • Noting 
a period in 'medieval Indian intellectual history' when such 
concerns were most prominent, MatHal nonetheless remained 
convinced that: '(A)fter some time, slowly but surely the 
theological or salvational concerns are replac'ed almost 
unconsciously by philosophical oness ., (By 'philosophical' is 
intended the 'analytical', 'non-theological' and 'rational') 
MatHaI, in turn, has been challenged for excluding the 
'essential spiritual dimension of the tradition6 '. The 
counterfactual is that Matilal might just have overlooked the . 
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soteriological concerns that motivated individual Indian 
philosophers to develop their sophisticated analytical skills, 
and indeed to superstructure an entire epistemology in service 
to this kingdom-of-ends. Thus it would be a distortion to 
characterize the tradition as holding that philosophy is useless 
for purposes of liberation (or· good only for 'a sort of 
"redemption" for the mystics'). The contested battleline drawn 
here betrays the tension highlighted by Buddhist thinkers, 
viz., between specializing in philosophy (as, systematic inquiry) 
for its own sake (darsana as 'pure philosophy') and utilizing 
philosophy. (darsana qua 'systemic in-sight') as a handmaiden 
for certain transcendental goals and visions that might well 
push our understanding beyond the limits of reason and 
(empirical) experience. I am thinking also of somewhat similar 
tensions and concomitant moves that fuelled the development 
of Western thought from the medieval theological anxieties to 
the anticipations of modern enlightenment protestations7 . But 
I shall defer my own conclusion to the end of the essay, after 
we have had a chance to examine and fully appreciate certain 
intellectual developments in the Nyaya of the 'medieval' (Le. 
MiddleS) period. The critique weaves through six Padas or steps 
as moves in the argument. 
PADA II 
As suggested in the preceding Pada, the Nyaya is widely 
recognized to underpin a view of knowledge and language that 
seeks the direct-most acquaintance with reality. and it strongly 
commends logical analysis coupled with empirical search for 
this investigation. The suspicion is that the canonical 
scriptural sources, the Vedas (Upani~ads included), might have 
left out a few things, or skipped some important details. There 
might well be more (or, from a stricter philosophical aperture, 
perhaps even less) to human knowledge than that to which 
the hoary> inscri ptions of the tradition and its methods. 
prescribed praxis or speculative tendencies, tend to point us 
toward. If speculation is undesirable then why not try out 
methods tested for their reliability and fallibility? Indeed. the 
term dar~ana itself seems to arise in the con text of the Nyaya 
linked as it is with tinv[k~ikf3 which in the early stages dealt 
with only two inquiries: into tidhytitnla (theological) and reason 
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(hetu). (So darsana is t.he sum-total of hurnan knowledge -
'seeing what-is' - resulting from systematic or philosophic 
investigation that frees one from ignorant burdensome 
embodimentlo.) 
A bifurcation occurs around 500 BeE. between the 
adhydtmic (or sadvidya, dtrnavidyd) and vyavahdric or samvrtti 
(conventional. empirical) concerns: If Vedic-Upani9adic 
though t concerned itself with Being as the ultimate basis and 
metaphysical substance of what there is, investigative 
reasoning and the 'ontology of substance' plays a conspicuous 
role in later Indian, specifically Brahmanic philosophy, as 
distinct from their muted role in mythology and closed 
wisdomll. 
Gautama in his canonical Nyayasutra l2 takes to 
expounding the logical aspect of dnvlk~ikl, i.e. epistem[ic-
ont]ological, or the inquiry into the proper mode of 
investigation which would disclose what there is and thereby 
elevate the inquirer to a higher level of wisdom. Anvlk~iki so 
conceived replaces ddhydtma - or dtmavidyd, i. e. the 
theological quest for an elusive ground of being (as sat) - as 
would be eVident, for exanlple, in the Upani~ads13. Gautama's 
response is in part a defense of the logical pre-enlinence and 
economy of a severely streamlined Vaise9ika ontology against 
the challenges from the Buddhist and Mlmarpsaka quarters 
(on different grounds of course). Questions of foundation are 
clearly at issue here, and the early proponents (protagonists) 
utilize Mlmarpsaka's model reasoning with texts for its method, 
but with the objective of sustaining a case for the logical 
necessity of a belief in the reality of the qata of experience and 
inference which invariably points to an extra-subjective factl 4 • 
It may seem surprising that the term 'nytiya' originally came 
from the Mlmarpsa, where it denoted rules of exegetical, 
didactic and interpretative reasoning - or 'hermeneutic' 
[l1llmarns] for short - but which in the hands of the 'ancient' 
dialecticians became tools for epistemological reasoning. or 
deductive syllogisUl corrlprising premises based upon 
perception. inference. and testimony. This exercise of quasi-
formal reasoning is aided by other technical discursive rnoves 
which carne into currency. viz., saT]l.5aya, vtida- vivCida, bddha, 
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pak~a. pfLrva-pak~a, vi.tavcJ.ii. jaZpa, nigrahasthana, 
samayabandha (or doubtl5 , rules of discussion, criteria of 
coherence and non-contradiction, proofs, disproofs. basis of 
agreement and diasgreement cavil, sophistry, time and point 
of defeat, treatment of the vanquished). These rules of 
argumentation or debate more generally have parallels in the 
legal discourse; the Mlmarp.sa in large measure contributed 
to this also, especially through the jurisprudential extensions 
of its interpretative schema. so that in broad terms 'nydya' 
could signify the measure of justice or ethical judgment of 
rightness', and by extension, anyaya, would signifY 'injustice 
or a violation under a rule or pain of law'. (This indeed is 
reminiscent of the religious and philosophical origins in the 
West also of the concepts of 'rhetoric', 'polemic', 'cavil', 
'rejoinder'. 'jurisprudence', 'debate', 'force of law', 
'hermeneutic'. 'precedent', 'testimony', 'verdict' - even 'science' 
- in their disinterested praxis and later distinct discursive 
formations.) Thus 'nydya' becomes the formal structure and 
format of such argumentation. and by refuting the adversaries. 
or demonstrating the superiority of its own paradigm for 
understanding and overcoming suffering (duJ,rkha), establishes 
its own siddhanta16 • Although the Buddhists also made 
polemical use of the nyaya method (there were Buddhist 
Naiyayikas too). the darsana of Nyaya is enlisted. in principle 
at least, to the service of Cisti.ka, i. e., the erstwhile Vedic 
tradition and its presumed textually-transmitted orthodoxy. 
To effectively defend the nascent Hindu philosophy 
against the 'negative ontology' of the Buddhist antirealist. 
however. the early BrahmaniC schools, the Vaise~ika in 
particular (and Purva Mlmarpsa to an extent) needed the 
concept of substance, the doctrine of universals and the 
assumption of a well-structured universe of enduring and 
individually identifiable entities as objectively as possiblel7 • 
With Nyaya this came to imply that we can have true 
knowledge of such reals.Knowledge is defined as a veridical 
cognition of the object as it is (yathtirthanubhava!;), Le. as an 
awareness that does not wander off the object. Nyaya is 
confident that we can have true cognition or apprehension 
(yathdrthdnubhflti) of all perceptible and even imperceptible . 
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objectslH, refined out of our general awareness of things to fit 
the restricted parameters; this in turn entails that we have 
already estabHshed the methods and conditions of valid 
knowledge (prama1J.as) (or that we are very nearly there). But 
how are we to know the standards of validation, without 
presupposing a knowledge of prdmdr).ya (in the sense of both 
methods and their vaHdity), unless we take the latter as given 
or self-evident, or presume that the same pramtir.ta yields both 
valid knowledge and knowledge of their own validity 
(pramauasamplava)? But Nyaya rejects svata!J.pramd1J.ya or 
self-evidential Validity, and defers the task of niscayavada, or 
final justification, to subsequent (paratah, parartha) test(s) or 
to an ab extra '~ark of excellence' (gu1J.anin;aya) in the 
knowledge derived. It cuts short the consequent risk of 
regresses by acceding to the pragmatics, pravrtti, or exertion 
of successful activity (sdmarthya), similitude, tenacity, logical 
coherence, received wisdom (mahtijaneya). and lastly, crude 
fallibilism (avirodhinJI9. 
Now the foregoing strategy may be fine for particular 
instances of knowledge or propOSitional claims20 , but it would 
be 'begging the issue' to generaHze it for the overarching valid- . 
rendering apparatus or pramdr).as ipsoJacto (Le. in respect of 
the meta-pramdJ)avada). So, can any pram(1).a test its own 
validity without risking a vicious circularity? Is a pramdr;a 
valid because it yields (true) knowledge, or does it yield (true) 
knowledge because it is valid? (Applying this to an instance 
of testimony, the question echoes a paradox of the 
'hermeneutic circle' and more significantly it also pre-dates 
Descartes' worry in a related context: P is true because the 
scripture asserts it; the scripture's asserting it is. reliable 
because P is true21 .) In other words, true knowledge (prama) 
is derived from valid methods (pramd1J.a); the validity of 
knowledge (pramduya) depends on the validity or reliability 
of the method of acquiring such knowledge (pramar:tasya-
pramaTJ-ya) , while this latter validity of the methods is to be 
tested by the after-knowledge derived from them (dnv[k~ik[ of 
pramd, pramiti, if it fits, works. is corroborated by the other 
pramaTJas, and so on)22. 
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It is no small wonder that the Buddhist dialecticians, 
especially Dinnaga who hounds the Ny ayas dstras, reject 
pra.mtiTJ.a as an objective knowledge-capacity as though one 
could sift out the cause from the constituent of the cognitive 
state (pramiti, prameya). on the one hand, and the veridical 
cognition from its formative instrumentation (prama from 
pramliT.la). on the other? The double-dipped earthen ladles of 
knowing remain- inexorably intertwined. The Buddhist 
dialecticians chastise the Bahyarthavtidins (real externalism. 
proponents who believe in the independence and individuation 
of all entities, including the self. from any awareness or 
consciousness) for seeing far too much formal similitude 
(sarupya) and one-directional causal dependence between the 
cognition (A) and its object, (A ~ ® B). To be sure, the causal 
originmy is wholly on the objective side of the Nyaya's 'given' 
while the more troubling intensional space of the subjective 
in the equation is entirely elipsed. 
On the other hand, the Buddhists appeal that the 
phenomenological noematic data (pramiti, B) is all that seems 
to be contingently presented, or inter-dependently constituted 
{Al<->Bl] , albeit in a passing cognitive episode (AI), and 
therefore the two sides of the _cognitive equation do not 
represent two distinct items related in unilateral causal 
dependency (A +- ® B) vs fA 1 <-> B 1]23. The Nyaya approach 
pays not much attention to the phenomenological content, 
and the intentionality of the object in the consciousness, for it 
denies psychology as having any particular bearing on the 
epistemological analysis of the given qua the intensional. (The 
suspicion is that such an approach is psychologistic to the 
core and it too easily yields to phenomenalism, a position 
which the Nyaya abhor. but which Mohanty has also 
questioned, and J L Shaw responded to in kind24 .) And so if 
the Mimarpsa dictum that knowledge requires knowing that 
one knows ~as any basis, then the Nyaya distinction (also 
echoed later in Bertrand Russell) between 'knowing what (x)' 
and 'knowing that (one sees x)' cannot be sustained. The only 
way out, as the pyrrhonic Jayarasi opted for, is a healthy 
scepticism, or relativism. 
Gautama however was less troubled by this conundrum 
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(sinee he was before Dinnaga's time [c. 5th cent. C E. when 
Sarvastivada began to give way to Yogacara Sautrantika's 
extreme nominalism)) than were his commentators and later 
Nyaya writers, like Uddyotakara, challenged as they were to 
defend the Nyaya position against renewed and sustained 
ndstitva (,there is not-ness') attacks. Although the criticisms 
were aimed primarily against the recalcitrant Buddhist schools 
that were becoming overzealous about the promises of astitva 
(,there is-ness') derived from the SarvasUvada perspective ('All 
there is just is'). these spilled over into the perceived 
Brahlnanic counterparts as well. So what is the 'first 
philosophy'25 that Gautama promulgates and what role does 
he give to prama1).a? Indian intellectuals seemed to have been 
obsessed with categorization and enumeration, and there 
seemed much eVidential faith in their common-sensical 
approach (perhaps one reason why Aristole encouraged 
Alexander-the-Greek [as he would be known in India), to visit, 
though not to plunder, the distant wisdom-saturated country). 
Naiyayikas are meticulous if not tedious in the art of 
classification, definition (lak~ana) and critical elaboration on 
a given topic to be investigated. They are the logicians of the 
tradition26 • 
PADA III 
The Vaise~ikas. which textually precedes the Nyaya, had 
settled for six (at most seven) expressible or positive categories 
as evidence of the independently existing reals taken to cover 
the entire knowable sphere, the subjective process of thought 
included. The technical term here for the existential category 
is paddrtha. literally a 'thing denoted by a word' or the 
nameable (and therefore knowable); these are, namely, 
substance (dravya. e.g. a banana), quality (gUlJa, yellowness 
of its skin), motion (karman, its ripening), universal (siimanya, 
its fruity banana-ness), particularity (viSe~a, this banana fruit. 
in my hand) and the relation of inherence (samavaya, banana 
to its parts). Each catego:ry is further classified into sub-sets 
of different natural kinds; e.g. there are nine substances, earth 
(prthivr). water (apa); heat (teja), air (vtiyu) space (akasa) , time 
(kala). place (dik), self (atma), and mind (manas). Qualities 
comprise pain (du1;tkha), desire (iccM), aversion (dve.$a), and 
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pleasure (sukha). Why are therejust nine substances? Because 
of the econolllY of ontology; and in any case, all other entities 
can be subsumed and explained under this category. Motion 
or karman involves a cause-effect process. However, certain 
strictures apply here as well. Thus. for instance, even though 
it is admitted that something cannot come out of nothing, the 
effect is thought not to be pre-existent in the originary or prior 
causal base (e.g. milk). which is radically different from, say, 
the curd or butter that is produced from it, as the causal 
process enlists various instrumentations and additional 
conditions or qualifiers (e.g. enzyme culture, churning, 
solidity-ing, and kdmaor desire in its presentification to a rnilk-
devouring Gajanana): a transformation is more than a mere 
manifestation27 • (This arambhavada or asatkarya, 
discontinuous causality, is a rejection of the Sarpkhyan 
position.) In the Vaise~ika ontology substance, quality and 
motion or effect-cause are co-extensive; one and the same 
being (sat) may possess all three; and nothing is possible 
without inhering in a substance of one sort or another. So 'is-
ness' or astitva which accounts for self-identity and 
individuality. along with designatebility (abhidheyatva) and 
knowability (jfteyatva), are the comInon characteristics of the 
six categories or classes of reals28 • 
Now two moves occur in respect of this schemata when 
Gautama enters the scene. First. he shifts the metaphysical 
emphasis from the Vaise~ika framework of substance ontology 
to a narrowly-conceived epistemic taxonomy. Second, he 
reconfigures the catalogue by expanding it to sixteen 
padlirthas, headed by prama1).os or methods of knowledge, 
which is consistent with the epistemological paradigm he is 
keen to promulgate. Only one of these is ontological, prameya, 
restricted object of knowledge, as the second padartha in the 
constellation that also subsumes most of Vaise~ika's six or 
seven categories (and their substantial subsets). Things that 
fall under the prameyaset and its subsets are alone truthfully 
cognizable (prameyatva). Gautama reduces these to twelve, 
namely, self (atma). body (sa.nra) , sense organs (indrtya) , mind 
(manas), cognition (buddhi), sensoria (artha, like smelling), 
activity (pravrtti), its outcome (phala), impurity (do~a), pain 
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(dulJ-kha), t.ransllligration (pretyabhava). and finally. release 
through theoria. (a.pavarga) of the self from all these 
insufferable tropes. (Sub-sets will include. for instance. antic 
substances derived from atomic-combinations, such as earth, 
water. air, fire, which are all reals.) Again, for reasons of 
economy. the ontic-prameya class of reals are kept to the 
minimum. For instance, there is no need to assume 'darkness' 
to be a separate entity - as the sacrificially-deluded 
Mlmarpsaka's think it - because its presence can be explained 
i·~ terms simply of the absence of light, or as a 'dark shadow 
j ' ... 'ng on the creatures depraved of the effulgence of light' 
~ yhi,_h might qualify the things drenched in darkness as 
having the quality of black colour. not though as colour itself; 
likewise for the 'dark omens of evil'!)29 Note however that 
nameability and knowability - which make for distinctness of 
cognition - do not necessarily make the 'isness' (esse) of the 
object dependent upon conscious minds: things exist in their 
own right independently of being perceived: it is enough that 
they are perceivable (and nameable). Even after God enters 
the scene, the Berkeleian imperative of subsuming esse to 
percipi is resisted to the end in Nyaya, but without much 
avail. In this connection, my own Mlmarpsic complaint against 
Nyaya's professed 'realist' ontology in some ways echoes J L 
Austin's claim i.n Sense and Sensibilia (1962) that Berkeley's 
empiricism was not detachable from his grander metaphYSiCS 
where even the God thrown in could not guarantee the 
coherence to what are really are only just a little more than 
sensory data of private worlds. 
Paradoxically, at the end of the journey, even the strictly 
knowables have their down side - in that they vanish! 
Nevertheless, these constitute the 'ultimates' or necessaries 
ofl}uman knowledge, all else is of contingent value. Everything 
is determinable in their specific particularity, including the 
self (litmd) , which is an object of a positive inference (via 
recognition) based on desire, aversion, motivation (prayatna)t 
pleasure, pain, and knowledge: like the Single glance at the 
danCing girl that evokes several aesthetic and other kind of 
responses in the cultured mind (Vdrttika on N.S. 1.1.10). 
Some remarks are apposite at this paint. First, it should 
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be noted that the whole is always greater in cOInplexily and 
composite relations than the sum of its parts, so the Buddhist 
idea of skandha-aggregation froIn simple to general will not 
do. Secondly, we should not loose cognizance of the weighted 
epistemological concerns underpinning Gautama's integrated 
'padiirthology~ : the Nyaya system henceforth will concern itself 
primarily with methods of valid knowledge (pramd1).a); the 
objects of knowledge are subordinate to and supervene on 
this logicism. Thirdly. there is talk of release from the pleasure 
and pain .in a state of perfection or summum bonum -
ni1).Sreyasa - which results from reaching a state of theoria, 
which in Nyaya amounts to attaining comprehensive 
knowledge (tattvqjnana) of the paddrthas in toto (or 'what all 
there is to know'). This will presumably inform the inquirer's 
ethico-religious practices as well. But what does this 
commitment to nibSreyasa amount to? Professor Mohanty has 
noted that this is a philosophic end or theoria and as such 
has no necessary connections with life-hereafter. in some 
remote loka, or merger with the ultimate being and so on30 • It 
amounts to nothing more nor less than the destruction of all 
mithytyfianQ., false understandings, as Gautama tells US31 . It 
might entail freedom from papa (negative moral traces) and 
purjya (cumulative merits from benevolent doings), and 
therefore escape from the angst (anxiety and fear). birth, old-
age, decay andre-death of mortal existence (safTlSara,janma. 
purvqjanma), thus entering a state of mok~a (liberation), even 
j'ivanmukti (embodied enlightenment). But Vatsyayana 
cautions the seeker against soteriological motivation in the 
pursuit of release from attachments and embodied 
entrapments with all its troubling emotions, problematic 
travails and stressful challenges32 • Thus, like the Buddhist 
Third Noble Truth and more like the Utilitarian Mill-Singer 
ideology, this embeds simply the minimization of pain and 
suffering, and eventual elimination of all pains and pleasures, 
beginning' with the exemplary individual and possibly 
universalizing this preference-satisfaction for the entire human 
race. But there is, as noted, apart from the cessation of all 
unsatisfactoriness due to ignorant pursuits and erroneous. 
judgments, no sublime elevation to be reached. Nor are all 
Naiyayikas agreed that the liberated state is replete with 
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happiness, or that there is even a trace of happiness, whether 
as ordinarily understood (Le. pleasures of life) or the promised 
sublime Upani~adic ananda. It is ajoyless end. For Uddyotkara 
this dissolutive disunion or kaivalya is tantamount to theoria, 
which however is more like a semi-somnambulant stupor, 
\yherein the self reposes in its disinterested or detachedly 
indifferent beingness, released from both the polarity of pain 
and pleasure33 • It is not just knowledge of the self, which is 
merely one of the twelve significant prameyas to be 
epistemically mastered, and is not as such a particularly 
privileged metaphysical goal that calls out for a solitary life-
renouncing pursuit as it is in some other philosophical 
systems. And there is no merging with another. greater, 
transcendental real or Ultimate either: all such assumptions 
are tan tamoun t to the transcendental ill llsion 
(viparUabhdvand). This amounts to 'release wi thou t 
transcendence': perhaps 'nirvaua-lite' is after all merely the 
desire-cleansed imaginary of saTftSiira (and it shares some 
common disavowals with Buddhist updya and psychoanalysis 
alike), 
But, to be sure, it is not the mind, buddhi, the grasping 
intellect. or concept- (vikalpa)· projecting mereological non-
substratum, that is the subject and agency of release (as in 
most Buddhist views). It is the self (dtrnd) that is ultimately 
released., as we said earlier, from ignorant embodiment. 
However, the self in its essence is neither a knowing state nor 
.action -driven (kartatva or bhdvana as the Mlmarpsakas would 
have it). And so this end-game of all quests is nothing like the 
unity of all categorical knowledge (as, say, in Kant's 'kingdom 
of ends'). much less the 'Thing-in-Itself', nor merely 
contemplative theoria as in Aristotle, nor the non-dual self-
knowledge as in Sailkara34 • It is as though the diaphanous 
self reaches a near-death moment. detached from the body 
and the mind, but not (yet) dying, because that which is 
external and nitya (atemporal) cannot be extinguished!35 It is 
indeed difficult to imagine what the utopic stages of Nyaya 
liberation would be like given the paucity of phenomenological 
narratives that bring out the precise meaning, contours, and 
consequences (e.g. for continued embodied liVing and after-
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life) of this ultimate achievement of subjectivity that appears 
to fall beyond consciousness, agency, emotions, morality. and 
objectivity36, 
What of morality and dharmavijnana born of 
transcendental praxis in this 'kingdom-that-ends'? It perhaps 
exemplifies a sublime 'view from nowhere', Still, questions 
about the psychological and moral standing of a being in such 
a state that defies easy deSCription and categorization remain 
largely unanswered, For instance, without self-awareness and 
fully manifesting sentient responses; affectivity; emotions and 
indeed mature consciousness; how can one be said to be 
capable of decent moral judgments and. reciprocally, be a 
subject of moral duties (regard or consideration on the part of 
others)? What virtues and disciplinary dispositions remain 
and continue to function in this virtual non-embodiment? For 
purposes of an ethical judgment of the appropriate moral 
treatment. how different is an individual in such a desolate 
state from, say, someone severely damaged in an accident or 
in an irreversible comatose state (e.g. from advanGed 
encephalitiS)? Would the question of samddhimaraT).a or 
spiritualized euthanasia arise at some point in the life of this 
highly-achieved philosopher-sage, as sallekhana does in the 
case of the Jaina munis and sadhvis at an advanced stage of 
physical deteriotation? In common-sense jargon, just what 
does he (she) do and what do we do with (for) him (her)? These 
issues cry out for a balanced philosophical response, and it is 
perhaps for this reason that the Middle Nyaya thinking on the 
nature of the diSCiplines involved. the description of the stages 
of enlightenment, and the end-result began to tilt a little more 
toward the Upani~adic and also Buddhist appeals, but only 
just. 
What in some ways is even more disarming is the fact 
that there is no lsvara, or God or transcendental Supreme 
Being mentioned under any of the categories or prameyas. 
Kanada does not· mention God in the VaiSesika-Satras, even 
. . 
though one would think substance ontology would concern 
itself with the nature of the ultirrlate possible being. lsvara or 
God does get mentioned in the Gautama's Fourth Adhydya 
but only in reference to a view held by some opponents in 
f 
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respect of the sole, efficient. cause responsible for creation, 
and for dispensatory awards. Gauiama r~jects this view as 
that would make for a causeless causality 37. Vatsyayana airs 
aloud some imagined adversary's question of, whether 
'creatorship' in God was absent altogether (echoing the ~gvedic 
doubt as to whether the world came about from Being, Non-
being. or Neither): to which he provides the terse answer that 
this speculation is meaningless until a proof of God's existence 
was forthcoming38. Later commentators tried to argue that 
Isvara was included under dtma which is a prameya under 
the category of substance (or 'being') in the Sutra. But then 
atmd is a matter of inference from various attendant 
dispositions of the mind and inner life; does lsvara-God 
become merely an object of inference on a par with the atma? 
In what sense, then, is this leading paragon of early Brahmanic 
thought true to what popularly passes as Hindu-dharma, or 
to Indian soteriology? Perhaps Gautama is beholden to Vedic 
or Upani~adic agnosticism or non-theism (as early 
Mlmarpsakas indeed were). But what of the pantheon of gods, 
devas. devlS and devatas of the Vedas and Smrtf? Perhaps 
Gautama (anticipating Heidegger) had thought human beings 
are too late for the gods and too early for God. I am suggesting 
that these absences are conspicuous as even the category of 
absence (abhtiva) is not among these catalogue of elusive 
substances to be known; not to speak of language (bhasa, 
other than implied in sabda) , intentionality39. adr!?ta (the 
unseen effectness), eternal time (nit yakdla) , and yogaja-
pratyak~a (mystic empiricism)40 among other enigmas, which 
become the corner-stones of Middle Nyaya's metaphysical 
realism that well surpasses the economy of Gautama's 
episteme of legitimate prameyas. 
PADA IV Abhava 
A category Gautama is conspicuously silent on but which 
becomes increasingly important in Nyaya epistemology is 
abhava. absence. It CaInes in three forms: prior and post-
nonexistence (before the food is lllade and after it has been 
eaten), unnihilatable nonexistence (once born cannot be 
rendered dvamsa or extinguished, e.g. the absentee gods), 
and atemporal nonexistence (the blue of the sky). Perhaps 
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abhavavada does not contribute to ni1)Sreyasa, for after all 
knowledge has to have direct contact with the existent t:'eals, 
not the prior or post-non-existent or some modal possibilities. 
Post-Gautama Naiyayikas begin to dwell on further such 
questions: do we actually perceive universals when we perceive 
particulars? (dewlap in a cow); and in what sense can we be 
said to have knowledge of things that are presently or 
perceptibly not in front of us, including intricate causality? 
Well, simply by apprehending the negation or non-existence. 
or 'empty whole' {the prior locus or anuyogin} left by the object-
at-large (pratiyogin) (e.g. the seeing of the not-cat-in-the-spot 
where it is normally seen or expectecfto be). But this anuyogin 
is not just an empty nothing: rather, it is a substrate as the 
prior locus of the pratiyogin of the now non-existent stuff: 
this supervenience cannot be rented apart. Likewise, 
abhavavdda. so developed, can now better explciin (than did 
the earlier Nyaya view) the darkness in the room and the 
shadow under the tree as being real absences of light from 
those spots: the light is the counter positive of darkness ih 
that lOCi, and this is the 'real' that we perceive (Le. there is a 
full-blown veridical awareness of the otherwise-real-in-the-
guise-of-its-absence) and not some 'black-stuff that 
supposedly infiltrates ~r overcomes the 'white space' in the 
ethereal spectrum (as some Bhatta-Mlmarpsakas believed), 
or the complete absence of any awareness in that moment 
(as Prabhakara-Mlmarpsakas believed)41. 
So, Abhava is not to be confused with MimaIPsaka-s' 
anupaZabdhi, i.e. elusive cognition or distinct non-
apprehension of an otherwise existent thing: the not-seeing 
of Devadatta in his own home. etc. (A taciturn Naiyayika buying 
his observant child a vadai or dough-naught would point out 
to her that she does not 'not-see the hole in the dough naught', 
rather that she beholds something, i.e. she sees the not-dough 
in the hole ·of the dough-naught which she clearly perceives.) 
Once a clearer distinction is made between non-existents and 
non-reals, Le. reals can be existent (present) and also non-
existent (absent, or imperceptible. or presentable only through 
another elusive pramd1).a, such as analogy, yogqja-pratyaksa 
or sruti, or scriptural testimony, etc), Naiyayikas go on to 
prameyas and J. L. Shaw 17 
develop an entire onto-logos based on this significant prameya. 
Abhava is elevated to a padartha-status as it is through an 
intimation of the absence of something, which we may never 
encounter in our empirical experience or our speech, that we 
have any awareness of it; thus, e.g., samavdya, the inherence 
relation of universals in particulars, the prescience of the cause 
of some strange after-effect (the felt tremors of an earthquake 
one slept through), intricate causal workings of dyads and 
triads - i.e. the minimum perceptibulwn or the atomic building 
blocks of pravrttf1-2. Likewise, the creatorship of God, even the 
existence of an otheIWise than non-being or absent God. ~s 
well as the attributes of God, and other possible realms of 
existence, perhaps even improbable objects (such as infinite 
numbe:r:s), indeed, also karma and its reSidual operandi. 
adrsta, and so on. 
. .. 
This echoes. in my reading at least, the Brahmanic re~ 
discovety of negative dialectic and difference (bheda) , even 
perhaps of sanyatli, or utter emptiness of things, which is the 
prerogative of Nagarjunian catu~koti or °four-corneredt 
deconstructive logic. The difference is that in the hands of the 
Naiyayika realists sflnyatva is turned into a positive dialectic 
by relegating (as Hegel would later do in his three-term logic) 
absense to the role of the counter-pos~tive,anti-thesis, which 
is inconceivable or acala (motionless) Without the prior 
presupposition of the positive existent. the thesis43 • (Abhava 
is not at aU like the rabbit's horn, sky-lotus, or the incontinent-
man's son, nor even the dissembled chariot-name by which 
King Milinda proclaimed to Nagasena that he had travelled). 
However. skipping ahead for a bit, by the time of Gailgesa, 
abhava is very much a designation for a separate entity: the 
non-existence of the pot does not rest entirely on the locus of 
the non-existence of the thing, but that this perception itself 
involves a particularity {uiSe~Clf.lata) (the cooked daughtnaught 
hole brought to me by the Korean chef when for my part I 
simply ordered 'dough-naught hole without the dough- . 
naught'!). This 'something' in the locus that triggers our 
perception of its non-existence must be an entUy44. And this 
ersatz ontology can proliferate the other -worlds as much as 
this world with abstract entities, or possibilias. and qualias, 
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spirits of the parted beloved ones. Is this one way of attaining 
'paradise on the cheap'?45 
PADA V The quest for elusive objects 
In this context. some of the modestly brilliant 
developments in Middle Nyaya occurred in the hands of one 
Jayantabhatta, who appeared to have become bored during 
his time in prtson (circa 9th century CE)46. The Naiyayikas 
had a wry sense of humour mixed in with cutting polemics to 
match those of Jayanta's chief paroapak~as, adversaries, who 
are Buddhists, like DharmakIrti. on the one hand, and the 
MlmaJpsakas, Prabhakara and Kumarila, on the other. He 
believed Nyaya has a stronger fool-proof defense of the 
authority of the Vedas than the Mlmarpsakas with their quaint 
autpattika (anadi. ever fixed, word-meaning relations) and 
apauru~eyatva (authorless) commitments. He builds this 
picture up by summoning the strength of a realist epistemology 
since Gautama's insightful days while also introducing some 
gems from the tradition of dtmavidyd. But his mainstay is to 
bolster pramaJJ.yavada, against Buddhist critiques. He 
emphasized asandigdham (conviction), bodhlibodhasvabhdva, 
collocation of conscious and unconscious conditions in the 
production of knowledge, and he reinforced the mark of non-
falsifiedness (avyabhycaritva, 'non-erroneous' or 'non-
promiscuous'). and newness of content in a cognition 
(anadhigatatva) as key criteria of epistemic truth (pramaTJ.ya)47. 
Thus memory (smrti), once and for all, is rejected as a pramliIJ.a. 
(as do the Buddhists), but pratyabhfjnti or recognition is 
admitted in a qualified way (which is significant for self-identity 
and a sense of tradition at' ... d historical continuity}48. 
However. the most significant innovation is Jayanta's 
theory of doubt as the fulcrum of logical investigation. Earlier 
commentators, such as Vatsyayana. Uddyotkara, and 
Vacaspati, had refused to ascribe a separate and distinct 
category to doubt, or their interpretations varied wide off the 
mark; but Jayanta finds it instructive to treat doubt as a 
separate epistemological category. It is with the help of doubt 
(sQJ]1SayaJ that inferential reasoning moves from induction 
based on sensible particulars to quasi-hypothetical deduction 
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based on intellectible objects. -and the critique of negation49 
(which in the West gave us forms of fallibilism. and in Buddhist 
India prasanga or reductio). Secondly. Jayahta defends the 
Nyaya rejection of self-cognition of knowledge (svaprakasa) 
as it arises as well as any direct connection of the self (dtrnd) 
in the awareness of the object; knowledge is directly and 
indefeasibly of the object; consciousness arises and subsides 
in the process of cognizing. Strictly speaking, consciousness 
is not owned by or intrinsic to the diaphanous self. 
Now one consequence of the Buddhist jurisdiction on the 
scope of the admitted pram(1).QS - pramdr.tavyavastha - is 
that this would avoid duplication of knowledge by one or the 
other pramQ.r,tas, and it would also incidentally place a halt 
on all manner of objects flooding in through the alleged 
prarn(1).as. or the spurious enactments of accepted 
pra.mli.1JaS50• Jayanta strongly rejects this and instead upholds 
pramdIJ.asQ1J1pZava (mutual disclosures). But he rejects the 
use of upamana (analogy) urged by the Mlma:rp.sakas in 
working out details of Vedic sacrifices which are learnt through 
their resemblance to other rites. However. sabdapramiiT).a is 
not undermined by Jayanta in the study (upadesa) of 
scriptures as well as its usefulness for aitihya, handing down 
of historical tradition. Jayanta includes aitihya under 
testimony. sadhubhibha~a5\ much to the chagrin of the 
Bhattas. But his unique contribution here is his view that the 
same criteria which establish the troth of other pramaua-
derived knowledge should apply to sabda, and he shows that 
they do. All these innovations have wide ramifications for the 
attenuated cosmology that begins to inform Nyaya darsana 
PADA VI 
Now I would like to comment further on Middle Nyaya 
appropriation and expansion of an ontology which radically 
distinguishes it from the more purely epistemological concerns 
of Gautama and his immediate commentators that we saw in 
the foregOing Padas. I have already alluded to the non-empirical 
causality implicated in imperceptible atomic configuration, 
and the introduction of God - with or without creatorship. 
But it is important to say something about the Cosmo-
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teleological argument that Udayana. most forcefully of all 
Middle Naiyayikas develops using syllogistic inference of the 
two available types (within pracmaepistemology at least); 'the 
potter kneading the clay yields the pot' (incorporating an 
efficient cause in addition to the common two, material and 
instrumental, causes) and. 'there is fire on the mountain, 
because there is smoke, invariably as in the kitchen'52. Nyaya 
did not make the clear distinction between material and formal 
deduction that Aristotle had bequeathed to the West. and so 
the invariance relation (vyiipttl is never without a material 
content (hence the concomitance of smoke and fire, but not of 
the abstract form: a has Q because a has P /; or, if P then Q . 
..... Q/, therefore -PI; or other modal formalisms). Nevertheless, 
one familiar with Thomas Aquinas' rationally weighted Five 
Ways plus Kant's moral postUlate - with all their attendant 
and conceptual problems - will recognize very similar moves 
and constructs in Udayana's appeal, variously to: inference 
of agency in the production of pot. kliryatva, extended to 
cosmological pro-creation by a prime mover (efficient cause 
argument); to which is added the intelligent design-argument 
(the clever clock-maker, or in post-modern theology, signature 
argument) garnered with the teleological or purposively-
perfection argunlent (which I think is largely adapted from 
the Sarpkhya. albeit towards an asatkaryavada causality via 
the vyiipti of fractal configuration in any ordered system); the 
moral argument, and, alas, even scriptural eVidence or 
revelatory argument. Again. like Aquinas's Five Ways, a 
number of ditIerent and pOSSibly prevailing conceptual and 
'empirical' considerations are welded together into \vhat one 
is tempted to dub an elegant Indian rational theological Way. 
Space does not permit me to go through the ingenuity of these 
arguments, which later Naiyayikas will refine even further, 
but let me comment on just three ·proofs'. 
Against the recalcitrant Bhaita-MlmaIpsakas. Udayana 
I defends appeal to the aforementioned ghata-Iogic. i.e. karyata-
kara1).attl (effectness-to-causality). viz.: a supreme agent 
weaves universes out of atoms, dyads, triads. However certain 
troubling meta-phYSical questions remain unanswered or 
inadequately addressed. Notably. have we witnessed the divine 
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spectacle however many times. as we have with pot-making 
(or. grandfather clocks, as Hume and Kant would later invoke 
under the same question asked of Aquinas's second 'Proof) to 
be able to make this generalization? No; "although the SCripture 
testifies to this fact. But what of the authority of the SCripture? 
And here is the inverse rub: rather than argue for the authority 
of the SCripture (Sruti, Vedas) on the grounds of its impeccable 
source. Nyaya reverses the move: the impeccability of the 
Scripture inexorably points to a source that cannot but be an 
omniscient being. Thus. whereas in most theologies (including 
Ramanuja's) 'revelation' or Sruti. is accepted because it is 
believed to be the inviolable Word of God, here God is accepted 
on account of the apparent inviolability of the Word of' 
Scripture. The magnificence of a work of art makes us ask: 
'Who is the artist'? Sarikara dismissed this argument very 
swiftly for it involves an obvious circularity ('a logical see-
saw'), namely, as Sailkara puts it, the omniscience of the Lord 
being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the. 
authority of Scripture in turn being established on the 
omniscience of the Lord. Kumarila. reinforcing this 
disjunction, asks: how can magnificence of a supposed author 
both be inferred from and at the same moment be an evidence 
for the authorship of a text? God appears to be elevated to 
the status of a self-endowed padclrtha or category of universal 
truth (and it must be so if God is to be asserted as one of the 
eternal reals). Philosophic non-apprehension cannot be 
grounds for God's utter non-existence, no more than the 
Mlmarpsaka would agree to deny aparv~ devaUi, heaven. and 
such imperceptibles. merely on the grounds of their non-
apprehension (and therefore their non-assertability); or that 
it is some defect of the pillar (sthWlu, which is a pun on Siva) 
that an inebriated man could not avoid colliding into it, so 
Udayana humoured Kumanla. The proof of this presence-by-
absence (abhavdbhdva). or 'transcendental zumzum', is 
forthcoming through anumdna, now sequestered behind the 
revised realist ontology of non-existence. In other words, is 
the final 'Proof either for God's existence or his (her) non-
existence forthcoming from the ruse of logic and argument? 
Hence an argument in favour of that of which no greater 
absence (mabhava mahtibhdva) can be conceived, which would 
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seem consistent with later Nyaya's invocation of absence as a 
fundamental category and the transcendental deduction based 
upon it. would effectively turn both Anselm and his mucj..ha 
(Fool) on their heads! 
But if inference, however persuasive it might be thought 
to be, is the best evidence that can be adduced for the 
probability of God's existence (but equally perhaps for his/ 
her absolute non-existence). then one wonders how millions 
of Hindus self-assuredly continue to seek darshan (subtle-
state presentification) of Vi~l).u, Siva-Sakti, and variegated 
forms of the transcendent in temples as in the vestibules of 
their inner minds, without entertaining even a shred of doubt 
about the authenticity of such folk beliefs? Phillips believes 
that there is inclusivism at work here; in as much Udayana's 
theism resonates with the vague 'universalism of the Veda (or 
its henotheism)' which however was already honoured 
culturally, and so Udayana's apparent endorsement of it is 
'mostly hand-waving'. 
Nevertheless, the Naiyayikas are not deterred by such non-
rational appeals. There is also the moral consideration. The 
moral postulate argues for the necessity of accounting for the 
dispensation of fruits and actions that sentient beings enjoy 
drawing against their previous merits and demerits (which 
accumulate inertly as adr~ta in daily living). Unless there is a 
supremely sentient and omniscient being, how could we 
conceive of this 'natural law' to function in utmost 
disinterestedness, or how could the justness of this retributive 
process be assured? Only a bodiless, compassionate God who 
is all-knowing (has nityapratyak~a), who is eternally present 
~nd powerful enough to unravel the .adr~ta, could 
accommodate this demanding supervisory role: thus a 
paramlitmil exist. Of course, MImarpsakas would retort that 
the apfLroa (remnants of sacrificial and ritual action in a subtle 
ethereal space) could as well be said to accomplish the same 
end by dint of its own latent potency and intrinsic karmic 
agency. 
To the Nyaya the idea of apfLrva would call for a 
complicated inference, while adr~ta can be known directly; 
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and God is the rnost cogent agent. It'would be unparsimonious 
to flood the heavenly ontology with such prolix items. There 
is a causal argument as well, namely that, something as inert 
and non-intelligent as the 'unseen effectuality' cannot operate 
without an agency, as the Mlmarpsa assume in the case of 
apuroa. Equipped with adr~ta and the pre-existent atomic 
constellation, God in his own eternal playtime (akalallla) , 
somewhat like the Demiurge of Plato's Timaeus, promulgates 
the universe afresh after its pralaya, prior temporal lapse. But 
how deep does such a God cut into the question of 'Being', 
and what in any case is the 'nature' of such a God? Is it sat-
cit-ananda unconditionally as in the Advaita conception of 
Brahman? Or is this a patriarchal superbeing whose sole task 
is to be a superintendent and cosmic-architect? However, it 
is to be noted that the arrival of God in Nyaya cosmology is 
important for a qUite different moral; for, unlike Vedantins 
after Ramanuj a, N aiyayikas do not prescribe nor appear to 
pursue any kind of elaborate rituals, practices. sadhana, 
beyond prayatna (motivated anxiety) over the strife of the 
empirical ego, and the supplemental theoria as worship that 
Udayana almost in a neo-vedantin mood suggests. They all 
mention yoga and so on, but it is an instrumentalist strategy 
towards knowledge with certitude (tattvqjfiana) , (akin to 
Descartes' 'Meditations' or Hussed's 'Cartesian Meditations'). 
The philosopher's reason appears to have its own heart. Thus 
there is no real linking of praxis to the text or to the quasi-
theological proclamations; rather the Naiyayikas set about 
consolidating their metaphYSical storehouse, and down-
scaling some of the overgrown hitherto empirical padarthas. 
Hence Raghunatha SiromaI).i, the 16th century C.E. Nyaya 
writer, collapses the already ubiquitous time, space and akaSQ 
with one super-SUbstance, the being of God (time-in-supreme 
being), which both simplifies the catalogue of substances 
(dravya) but also makes for eternal time (nityakdld) - a category 
which hitherto had not appeared in the Nyaya taxonomy. 
However. even at this late stage of Nyaya's theology, there is 
no indication of a meaningful search for God as the Being of 
being, or the Ground of all be-ing, or a Being whose own self-
erasure shines infinitely in the face of the other, as would be 
true of much of Western theology after Spinoza, Fichte and 
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Hegel (culminating in Heidegger and Levinas). God is just 
another self, albeit one writ large or suspended over the cosmos 
(param-atma) , which is not a very sophisticated theistic 
conception and would scarcely rival even Ramanuja~s more 
involved and implicative idea of the identity-in-difference of 
Brahman and the world as the Body of God. 
Secondly. the notion of sarvqjfta, or omn~science. is 
introduced which enables the elevation of the powers of mortal 
or ordinary perception to the most extraordinary capabilities. 
No human being is capable of omniscience; and since all reals 
are objects of God's knowledge, for human beings to know all 
the reals they must possess God's knowledge; but this begs 
the question. Hence Nyaya epistemology begins instead at the 
mundane level «epistemology from below') and happily extends . 
certain capabilities of ordinary perception (laukikapratyk~a). 
Perceptual consciousness moves from nominally seeing bare 
particulars to a veridical grasping of universals inhering in 
the particulars (saTJlyukta-samavaya) and onwards to 
sCimiinya-lak~ar,ta-sannikar~a or the sense-organs contact 
with all the instances of that universal at once (the basis of 
inductive generalization). But there was ambivalence over the 
claims about the alleged extraordinar:y feats of perception, or 
that one needs to consider these under a separate category of 
alaukika or yogic perception. Jayanta, for one, accepts 
intuition (pratibhii) as a kind of ordinary perception. but he is 
also careful to note the distinction between usual and unusual 
contact of the senses with the object, and t.he further 
distinction of both of these from "extraordinary' in the sense 
of yogic powers of the sages which do not supervene on any 
kind of sense-organ contact, usual or unusual. What have 
been apprehended are qualias which can have as it were 
phySically disembodied (Le. s·eparated from their substantial 
base) presence. The ability to apprehend objects and events 
at great distance or temporal location are included under 
intuition as a kind of perception, albeit of quQ1ias inclusive of 
universals as described (qua gU1J.Citlta sdmdnya-lak~ar.ta). 
Other directly invisible objects that are grasped through 
intuition comprise: first -up, the self {here moving beyond the 
previous introspective or inferential recognition on the basis 
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of desire. aversion. etc., for it being the greatest skin-deep 
whole). and elusive objects such ether. space. time, atoms, 
dyads-triads, and numbers. causality, mind, adr~ta, karma 
and the souls of others. However. at the same time 
Jayantabhat,ta goes into some detail on the problem of 
omniscience and yogic perception which he also accepts as 
an authentic disposition of enlightened sages, and he retorts 
to Buddhist, Jaina and Bhatia objections, by arguing that 
even in fear-sticken imagination the~e is the unusual 
perception of the fearful. albeit elusive, object (such as evil, 
God, an impending catastrophe, or a miserable life-hereafter). 
(To which Dharmaklrti had with his keen sense of irony 
quipped: the corpse-gazing ascetic, the ecstasy-wet dreamer, 
the fear-stricken fool alike, see more in certain objects than 
what is given through the pramar,tas!) Visvanatha grants 
continual knowledge of all things to the yukta; while viyuktas 
in the state of cintana (J aina upayoga) and concentration can 
attain what Phillips desirously calls, 'mystic empiricism'. 
Bhasarvajfla (900 eE). who interestingly enough rejects 
upamtina (analogy) as an independent means of knowing, and 
virtually overturns the early Nyaya naivete towards Vaise~ika 
categories, urges that salvation need no longer be dragged 
over the life-long arduous process of di~pelling evexy bit of 
misapprehension; rather, God-knowledge can be 
instantaneously efficacious. on the model of self-knowledge 
of the advaitins. Since God is the most reliable apta, 
trustworthy person, his every word has to be heard and 
understood with all our conventional-linguistic powers or 
saktt and for this sabdapramMa (conventional testimony). 
though not necessarily srutiprlirndT;tya (scriptural testimony). 
is immensely important. (Gailgesa's monumental work on 
8abda was intended as an exemplary among the prClJ1l.Qr:las. 
and a framework for authentication of testimony-derived astika 
orthodoxy against the Buddhist rejection of the validity of 
sabdaprCunli1JQ..) Under this theory also. the word-meaning 
relation in Nyaya is not eternal as. it is in Mlmarpsa, rather 
this special linguistic relation is said to be saTTlketa, 
conventional. although it is God who sets this up at the 
beginning of each world-generation as he also re-promulgates 
the Vedas, the gods, and other imperceptibles.). 
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Samaptipdda 
Let me end with these concluding remarks. I have shown 
that while Nyaya is loath either to reject some or to admit any 
new pramC1.J)as. it nonetheless cannot help extending the scope 
of the accredited pramti1:tas. It achieves this by introducing 
divisions within the praJTliir,tas and moderating their reach. 
thereby justifying the inclusion of a wider range of premeyas 
and subsidiary things than would otherwise be acceptable. 
However, apart from the historical-textual survey I provide, 
my concern has been to show how different salvational and 
social agendas have fuelled or presented fodder for revisioning 
epistemology and metaphysics. The otherwise stringently 
physicalist and almost secular (from our modern perspective), 
ontology of the Vaise~ika that informs early Nyaya philosophy 
finds its built-in closures disturbed as the temptation grows 
to draw more and rnore things. ordinary and extraordinary, 
mundane and transcendentally sacred; into the ambit of 
BrahmaniC metaphYSiCS (as distinct from its mythology and 
ritual theology). However, these would-be prameyas stand 
starkly in need of epistemic justification. Scholars of the Middle 
Nyaya period are well aware of these constraints and the 
skepticism surrounding such possibilities. The existence of 
God is one such prameya in search of epistemological 
legitimation. And likewise; apavarga or kaivalya-like release 
from bounded existence, of suffering and pain and pleasure 
alike. This has the consequence of bringing Nyaya closure to 
adhyatmavidya, and allowing Nyaya to come to its own as a 
darsana rather than remain confined to the erstwhile 
'analytical' anvIk~ikI where it began. Both Matilal and Phillips 
overdetermined the case; the former, in all his wisdom; toward 
the 'prejudice of the analytical'; the latter, in his enthUSiasm, 
toward the pervasiveness of the spiritual dimension in Indian 
intellectual history: but both at least meet most agreeably in 
Middle Nyaya at the cross-roads. 
As I have argued. several lacunae in the Nyaya treatment 
of the Vaise~ika categories (padarthas) suggest a move away 
from positive empiricalism. For it is puzzling how certain 
properties, relations, substances. even motion and abhavQ 
(absence), are moved around, subordinated, or reduced to 
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minimal qualia within non-empirical causality. Raghunatha's 
collapsing of time and space with God abets Navya-Nyaya's 
defense of ad.r~ta (remote trace-effect), sakti (potency), nitya-
perceptions (ESP), and sabdapramliT.ta (testimony, increasingly 
includes Scripture). While early Nyaya had underscored 
ni1:tSreyasa alone as the summum_bonum, with Bhasarvajfla 
and Udayana a powerful cosmo-teleological argument for God's 
existence is formulated, promising mok~a and sarvajita 
(omniscience) in God's unitary knowledge. Spiritual 
materialism and divine realism come together to yield a 
transcendental universalism unique only to the navya-Nyaya, 
which has located itself at the furthest possible extreme 
imaginable from its more humbler roots in exegetical 
Brahmal)a scholasticism (mimliI]1sd). 
The appeal to Scripture or Sruti as evidence is itself a 
radical departure from the scope of sabdaprwndr,ta, while the 
founders of the Nyaya School had it confined to laukika 
utterances, available to all, including the mlecchas (barbarians 
or aliens). Nevertheless, Udayana boldly claims its 
achievements in respect of srutiprdmtiJJ-ya (epistemological 
theory of scriptural testimony) qualifies Nyaya, not its rival 
Advaitavedanta, as spearheading the culmination of Vedic-. 
Upani~adic thought. And this is presumably achieved without 
any need of linking the text to real ritual praxis. The 
parsimonious Vaise~ika (whom Sailkara called 
ardhavaindsika, ·half-denuders'), have for long been relegated 
to the lowest rung among the darsanas. while ersatzist realism 
of Nyaya rivals to unseat Advaitavedanta's ersatzist idealism. 
Expropriation incorporated. 
The elegant grounding of Nyaya's theodicy on the solid 
causal model of explanation, failed however to evoke the kind 
of enthusiasm towards a sustained philosophical theology as 
it did, say. in the Arabic and classical Western academies. 
Udayana and Jayanta seemed to be no true match to their 
Western counterparts, such as Duns Scotus who built on the 
scholasticism of Anselm, Augustine. Aquinas, et aZ; or for that 
matter to Plantinga in our more cynical age. Rather, their 
theodicy attracted polemical assaults more than support, from 
Vedantic objections, and even vehemently from the a/ 
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theological Mlmarpsa and Buddhist reductios of suffering and 
what we nowadays call The Problem of Evll'. Nyaya's quasi-
'Middle Knowledge' position where God is at the behest of 
adr~tayantra (as it were, an automated calculus of merits and 
demerit voltas of each pathetic soul) made little or no room 
for grace or mercy, love, devotion and surrender, and it left 
both the hardened disbelievers and ardent believers alike 
thoroughly disenchanted. And so its theology probably and 
practically had little impact on the wider populace. For the 
supppsed new discoveries through reason that Nyaya had to 
offer was already becoming part and parcel of the common 
ethos or faith-orientations of the people. Still, like the 
philosophers of medieval or Middle Christianity, they felt 
compelled to work out sophisticated rational defense of their 
tradition; but to this day the question, whether the God or 
Absolute of the Philosophers is the same as the God of religions 
remains unsettlingly unresolved. Or, what does the 
Philosopher's God have to do with God of the folks? 
NevertQ.eless, Phillips is persuaded that Nyaya's objectivism 
and realism 'fit nicely with its theism'; it is 'God's perfect bird's-
eye view' or deferred objectivism that functions in the long 
run as a heuristic for everything is knowable, even by human 
beings! But it also flounders on this nicety. 
Nyaya is often equated with pramdr.ta-stistra, indeed it 
became synonymous with logic and epistemology in Indian 
diirsanic history; its early to middle phases bespeaks a marked 
twist towards prameya-sllstra. Gangesa who heralded in 
Navya- or the latterly 'New' (i.e. neo-l, phase was an exception 
to the rule. I have argued that Nyaya's refinement of the logical-
epistemological engine IpramaTJ.yavlida) had an~genda 
common to much of -medieval Hindu thought, which was to 
claim territory over an authority increasingly usurped by 
Vedanta. Bhartrhari's grammatology, Yoga, the Epic, Agama, 
Bhagavata. -pasupata. Tantra and Pancatantra schools 
(Sarvadarsanasaftgraha mentions several more) - i.e. basically 
Smarta and Smrti heritages. And to inherit this prestigiously 
sacr"ed seat philosophers belonging to each school had to 
demonstrate that they alone had a right to ascendancy to 
Aryavartastika (orthodoxy in the land of the noble race),or 
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face being routed (a fate apparently befallen on the Indian 
Buddhist agonists. and to a lesser extent on the non-theistic 
MimaIPsakas) . 
More significantly. in their treatment 'of the paraphernalia 
of padarthas. there is the over-pervasion of binartes. light-
dark. etc, and lack of sensitivity to difference, even to adhikWi-
bheda within dharmas or normative orders; the usual 
emphasis on dSramadharm~ p~i'irthas, varr.la, yqjfta. even 
for purposes of liberation, seems wanting, as Daya Krishna 
has rightly complained; and in any case Nyaya's mok~a turns 
out to be a bit of an anti-climax; and its God a trifle boring. 
Further, al though anv'ik~a or anvtk~ikl is commended in 
political treatises, like Kautilya's Arthasdstras, Nyaya 
philosophers have paid scant attention to issues of pray aScitta 
(legal restitution), social ordering, gender issues, marginal 
voices, and such real-life vyavahdric moral concerns, and 
indeed to anyaya. or the recognition and treatment of injustice. 
What could the political thinker do with the kevalin, the lone-
star-ranger mli-nava? Nyaya takes a flight toward the 
transcendental as quickly as it puts on the logical boots, until 
Gangesa and Raghunatha SirOmalJ.i intervene to 'put the. 
brakes on' and arrest the wayward digression, returning Nyaya 
to the earlier epistemic-linguistic turn. Raghunatha, some 200 
years after Gangesa, was even more subverSive of the Navya-
Nyaya parsimony, as he rekindled some bf the forgotten 
ontological and logical categories from the Vaise~ika taxonomy; 
and ,he appeared to want to dispense altogether with the 
category of a:tma, opting instead for contingent embodiment 
(deh.Cltm.cwlida) as the fore-ground of experience. He also wrote 
a commentary on the critical Advaita writer, SrI Har~a's, 
Khar.td.anakhar.tdakhadywn. 
A supplemented Humean paradox captures better my 
general conclusion: a little philosophy makes a man an atheist: 
a great deal (of philosophy) converts him to religion; a little too 
much theology drives him back to (critical) philosophy. The 
moral of the narrative and critique offered here is that the 
intellectual culture of· a people does not remain static and 
subordinate to dominant paradigms or sampradayas: culture 
as a whole thinks, reflects on its beliefs and grounds for the 
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same, and if it warrants its judgment it will discontinue with 
the past: sOInetimes however the present is ahead of the 
thin·kers, and it takes a while before a critical re-orientation is 
allowed to have its way. The thinkers I have focused on 
evinceing just this tendency, even if inchoately. Professor 
Matilal and at least three of his ardent admirers, Frits Staal, J 
N Mohanty and J L Shaw, I think it fair to say. have shared 
this philosophical impatience. Likewise, from another non-
jadvapuri angle, Daya Krishna has been questioning not only 
the totalizing holism circumscribed around the darsanas, but 
also of the identity of each darsana as though they were 
anything more than a. concatenation of individual works 
responding to a commonly-perceived problem. However, his 
. startling conclusion is that there is nothing called Indian 
Philosophy! Professor Mohanty, on the other hand, is less 
troubled by this alleged crisis-point reached in Indian 
philosophy; but he (too) believes that the darsanas should be 
open to internal and external CritiCisms, and that only in this 
way will the future or continuing development of Indian 
philosophy or darsanic thought be assured. Thus while 
darsanic philosophy busies itself with concerns about what 
there is and how best to know everything or indeed all truths, 
it should be alert also to what there is not and how we might 
never know with certainty in whatever mode what we already 
don't know. 
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India (1999) and in Auckland, New Zealand. I am grateful to Professor 
J N Mohanty and Dr Jay L Shaw for their comments to the paper, 
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Bilimoria, 'Sailkara's attenlpted reconciliation of 'You' and '1': 
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Prameyas and J. L. Shaw 37 
we not. Daya asks, call Udayana a 'pracchanna advaitin'? JICPR. vol 
XIII No 3, May-August 1996, p. 15I. 
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Daffodils, Seeing as Daffodils', in Relativism. Suffering and Beyond 
(Matilal Memorial Volume I), (op cit) p. 212 ('promiscuous' is 
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